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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE: DEFINING THE
SCOPE OF AGENCY POWER
CYNTHIA MELTZER*
In the 1984-85 term, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided
numerous cases involving Administrative Law and Procedure. Six of
these cases were particularly noteworthy and will be reviewed. These
cases will illustrate the wide and varied areas that affect administrative
procedure and law. Furthermore, it will become clear how the judicial
system has a marked effect on the administrative process. The facts and
issues of the cases will be presented. The findings and reasoning of the
Seventh Circuit will then be set forth. Where appropriate, some analysis
will be offered.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION ON ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
Many have challenged agency actions and procedures as being viola-
tive of the Constitution. During the 1984-85 term, the Seventh Circuit
decided many cases that dealt with agency decisions that allegedly con-
flicted with basic rights afforded by the Constitution. In particular, the
Seventh Circuit decided three cases that have significant import in this
particular area of administrative law. These cases dealt with the Fourth
Amendment, the Fifth Amendment and the Privacy Act. Each of the
three cases will be examined below.
DUE PROCESS AND THE PRIVACY ACT
PERRY . FBI
The Seventh Circuit had three issues before it in Perry v. FBI. I The
first two issues involved the Privacy Act and the third issue involved the
Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
FACTS
In 1976, the plaintiff, Rixson Perry, applied for employment with
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms ("BATF"). As part of the
application procedure, Perry consented to and signed a form authorizing
the release of all information contained in any police and criminal re-
* B.A., University of Michigan, 1983; J.D., IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 1986.
1. Perry v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 759 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1985).
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ports pertaining to him. Shortly thereafter, Perry received a tentative
offer of employment from the agency. In May of 1976, pursuant to a
BATF request, the FBI sent BATF a report on Perry which contained
numerous criminal allegations, 2 all of which Perry denied. In June of
1976, the BATF withdrew its tentative offer of employment.
Perry maintained that the FBI report was false. Hence, Perry
brought an action alleging that the distribution and use of a false report
by the agencies involved, violated rights guaranteed him by the Privacy
Act and the Constitution. The three issues on appeal were, 1) whether
the FBI violated Section (e)(5) of the Privacy Act by compiling and dis-
tributing a false report; 2) whether the FBI violated Section 552a(b) of
the Privacy Act by sending the report to BATF without Perry's consent;
and 3) whether the dissemination of the report implicated a liberty inter-
est 3 protected by the Due Process clause by making it virtually impossi-
ble for Perry to obtain a federal law enforcement position.4
ISSUE 1-THE FBI's ALLEGED VIOLATION OF SECTION (e)(5) OF THE
PRIVACY ACT
The Seventh Circuit first discussed the issue of whether the FBI vio-
lated section (e)(5) of the Privacy Act by distributing and compiling a
false report.5 Section (e)(5) of the Privacy Act requires all federal agen-
cies to "maintain all records which are used by the agency in making a
determination about any individual with such accuracy, relevance, time-
liness and completeness as is reasonably necessary to assure fairness to
the individual in the determination. ' 6 The question was whether section
(e)(5) requires the FBI to assure the accuracy of records procured from it
and used by the procuring agency to make decisions concerning employ-
ment. The Seventh Circuit held that section (e)(5) applies only to the
agency making the determination, as opposed to the agency which
2. Id. at 1273-74. The allegations were as follows: 1) Perry posed as an FBI agent, a United
States Marshall, and an Illinois State Trooper; 2) Perry had stopped cars using a siren and red
emergency light; 3) Perry carried numerous weapons in the trunk of his car; and 4) Perry possessed
various forms of police identification as well as badges. These allegations were made by third parties.
For purposes of the decisions, the Seventh Circuit assumed the report was false.
3. A liberty interest is an interest in being free to choose. For example, one has a liberty
interest in being free to seek employment, or being free to go to school.
4. 759 F.2d at 1274.
5. Id.
6. 5 U.S.C. § 552a. Section 552 is part of the APA, but is commonly referred to as the Pri-
vacy Act. Section 552a(e)(5) reads in pertinent part: an agency that maintains a system of records
must, "maintain all records which are used by the agency in making any determination about any
individual with such accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness as is reasonably necessary to
assure fairness to the individual in the determination."
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merely supplies the information. 7
First, the Seventh Circuit stated that two other district court cases
were inconsistent with the statute's language and its legislative history. 8
One case, R.R. v. Department of the Army,9 dealt with the amendment of
records, pursuant to § 552a(g)(1) of the Privacy Act after they were
proven to be factually incorrect.' 0 However, in Doe v. United States Civil
Service Commission," the district court (S.D.N.Y.) held that an agency
serving as an investigatory arm of another agency which, responsible for
making employment decisions, is subject to the accuracy provisions of
the Privacy Act. Yet the Doe case is distinguishable from Perry since in
Doe, the agency that disseminated the information was requested by the
procuring agency to gather the information. In Perry, BATF did not ask
the FBI to gather information on Perry, just to release all pertinent infor-
mation it already possessed.1
2
The Seventh Circuit did not discuss the two district court cases, in-
stead, it proceeded to discuss the pertinent statute's language. Section
(e)(5) applies only to records that an agency uses to make determinations
about an individual. The statute does not specify what type of determi-
nations it refers to, however, this case specifically concerns employment
determinations. The Seventh Circuit, relying on legislative history, inter-
preted section (e)(5) as applying to any agency that makes a determina-
tion 13 that affects an individual. The court appears to rely and focus on
the decision-making power of the agency. Thus, according to the court,
the FBI did not violate section (e)(5) since the FBI was not the agency
making a determination affecting Perry. The FBI merely sent a report
already in its files pursuant to a BATF request.
Second, the court discussed section (e)(6) of the Privacy Act. Sec-
tion (e)(6) requires an agency to ensure the accuracy of the records it
sends to anyone other than another agency. '4 Based on section (e)(6), the
7. 759 F.2d at 1274-75 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(5)).
8. 759 F.2d at 1274-75 n.3.
9. R.R. v. Department of the Army, 482 F. Supp. 770. (D.D.C. 1980). In the R.R. case, the
reports were already proven to be factually incorrect. Thus, this case is different than Perry in that
the records in Perry were only alleged to be factually incorrect. The R.R. case is not really compara-
ble to the case in point.
10. 482 F. Supp. 770, 775 (D.D.C. 1980).
11. 483 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). This case involved an agency collecting information
with the purpose of giving it to another agency to use to make a determination about an individual.
The court found that even though it was an inter-agency transfer if it is serving an investigatory role
it is subject to the accuracy provisions of the Privacy Act.
12. 759 F.2d at 1273.
13. 759 F.2d at 1275. See H.R. REP. No. 1416, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1974); see also S. REP.
No. 1183, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1974).
14. Section (e)(6) provides in pertinent part that agencies shall:
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court reasoned that the agency transfer of records and reports is exempt
from the accuracy provisions of section (e)(6). Accordingly, the court
concluded that the language of section (e)(6) and the lack of any other
relevant provisions in the Privacy Act indicated that Congress intended
that agency-to-agency transfers of records be exempt from section
(e)(6). '5
The decision on this issue appears sound when compared to the lan-
guage of the statute. However, the court never discussed the purpose of
the Privacy Act which is to protect the public interest by outlining the
responsibilities of federal agencies that collect and distribute information
about individuals. 16 It does not seem logical that agencies are not re-
quired to assure the accuracy of the information they collect if they
transfer it to another agency. A fairer approach would be to require that
an agency be responsible for the accuracy of the information it possesses
whether or not the information is used by that agency to make a determi-
nation about an individual. Thus, the decision is sound based on the
Privacy Act language, yet, unfortunately, it seems very unfair.
ISSUE 2-WHAT CONSTITUTES CONSENT TO THE
RELEASE OF RECORDS
Section 552a(b) of the Privacy Act 17 prohibits the release of infor-
mation about an individual unless that individual consents to the release
in writing. Perry alleged that the phrase "police and criminal records"
was limited to prior arrests and convictions and thus, did not include the
FBI report which contained mere allegations of misconduct. Contrarily,
the Seventh Circuit held that the phrase "police and criminal records" is
broad enough to include all reports, including the FBI report.' 8
In so holding, the court concluded that the release was not vague
and Perry gave valid consent.' 9 In effect, by signing the form, Perry con-
sented to the release in accord with section 552a(b) of the Privacy Act.
... prior to disseminating any record about an individual to any person other than agency,
unless the dissemination is made pursuant to subsection (b)(2) of this section [Freedom of
Information Act requests], make reasonable efforts to assure that such records are accu-
rate, complete, timely, and relevant for agency purposes.
5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(6).
15. 759 F.2d at 1275-76.
16. Doe, 483 F. Supp. 539, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The court here examined the overall purpose
of the Privacy Act. In Perry, the court merely looked at specific sections of the Act.
17. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). This section requires that an individual request or consent to disclosure
in writing before any agency may release information concerning that individual.
18. 759 F.2d at 1276.
19. Id.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The FBI did not violate section 552a(b) by releasing the report to a sec-
ond agency.
ISSUE 3-WHETHER THE FBI IMPLICATED A LIBERTY
INTEREST OF PERRY'S
The last issue the Seventh Circuit considered was whether the dis-
closure of the FBI report implicated a liberty interest protected by the
Fifth Amendment. Perry alleged that the FBI deliberately attempted to
deny him employment in any branch of federal law enforcement, and
made it practically impossible for him to obtain a federal or state law
enforcement position. The Seventh Circuit held that depriving Perry of
possible employment implicated a liberty interest. The court also held
that because Perry was not given the opportunity to refute the allega-
tions, he was not afforded due process of law. 2
0
In so holding, the Seventh Circuit first found that a liberty interest
was involved.21 A two-part test was articulated by the Supreme Court in
Board of Regents v. Roth.22 Under the two-part test, a liberty interest is
implicated when 1) charges made against an individual may seriously
damage his standing and associations in the community; or 2) the state
imposes a stigma or other disability on an individual foreclosing his abil-
ity to take advantage of other employment opportunities.23 In applying
this test, the Seventh Circuit relied on the case of Larry v. Lawler 24 in
which the two-part test was applied.
In Larry, the plaintiff applied to the Civil Service Commission to be
put on a list of eligible applicants. The plaintiff was rated ineligible due
to his employment record and his habitual use of alcohol. Consequently,
the plaintiff was barred from federal employment for a period of up to
three years. 25 The court found the state imposed a stigma on the plain-
tiff, the second part of the test, by barring him from federal employment.
Thus, the agency implicated a liberty interest in the manner in which it
denied the plaintiff employment. In Perry, the court found that as in
Larry, the second part of the test applied to Perry's situation. Although
20. Id. at 1280.
21. See supra note 3 for an example of a liberty interest.
22. 408 U.S. 564 (1978).
23. Id. at 573-74. The Supreme Court outlined the criteria for determining when a liberty
interest is implicated. The first part of the test deals with ones standing in the community which can
be analogized to a defamation or libel claim. The second part of the test deals specifically with
employment opportunities. It is important to remember that only one part of the test must be met in
order to find that a liberty interest was implicated.
24. 605 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1978).
25. Id. at 956-57.
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Perry was not absolutely barred from federal employment, the court
found the state foreclosed his ability to take advantage of other employ-
ment opportunities. Coupled with the fact that Perry was not allowed to
refute the allegations, the court found the FBI implicated a liberty inter-
est.26 Consequently, the Seventh Circuit remanded the case to the dis-
trict court to determine whether the FBI had violated Perry's due
process rights.
BATF supposedly relied on the FBI report. However, what consti-
tutes reliance is unclear given certain facts.27 Yet, the central issue the
court addressed is that an agency should not be able to rely on a report
without giving the individual an opportunity to refute the allegations.
The Seventh Circuit has made a fair decision in this area since it held
that regardless of the provisions in the Privacy Act, a liberty interest may
be implicated and due process violated if an individual does not have an
opportunity to address allegations made about him.
FOIA AND THE PRIVACY ACT
SHAPIRO V. DEA
An individual may request information from an agency pursuant to
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)28 or the Privacy Act.29 In Sha-
piro v. DEA ,30 the Seventh Circuit examined the relationship between
FOIA and the Privacy Act. The court held that the two Acts are in-
dependent of one another and a denial of information under one Act does
not mandate denial under the other. 31
In Shapiro v. DEA, the plaintiffs requested records from the DEA
under the FOIA and the Privacy Act. The requests were denied because
the district court found that the information requested was exempt from
disclosure under the Privacy Act section 552a(j)(2).32 Accordingly, the
26. 759 F.2d at 1281.
27. Id. at 1277. There was some question as to whether BATF actually relied on the report.
Id. at 1278. The dissent pointed out that BATF and other agencies actually conducted investiga-
tions of their own and thus did not completely rely on the FBI report. Id. at 1283. However, Perry
was not given the opportunity to address any allegations.
28. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). This is the Freedom of Information Act (hereinafter referred to as
"FOIA").
29. 5 U.S.C. § 552a. This is the Privacy Act which regulates when information may or may not
be released as does "FOIA."
30. 762 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1985).
31. Id. at 612-13.
32. Section 552a(j)(2) provides in pertinent part:
The head of any agency may promulgate rules ... if the system of records is-(2) main-
tained by an agency or component thereof which performs as its principal function any
activity pertaining to the enforcement of criminal laws, including police efforts to prevent,
control, or reduce crime or to apprehend criminals, and the activities of prosecutors,
courts, correctional, probation, pardon or parole authorities, and which consists of
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district court found that the information was also exempt from disclosure
under section 552(b)(3) of the FOIA, which states that the FOIA does
not apply to information which has already been exempted from disclo-
sure by statute. 33 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court decision. 34 The decision was appealed to the Supreme Court which
remanded the decision back to the Seventh Circuit due to a change in the
law.
35
On October 15, 1984, the Privacy Act was amended in part by the
Central Intelligence Information Act.36 The added provision provides
that an agency may not rely on any exemption in the Privacy Act to
withhold information which is accessible under the FOIA section 552.
37
On consideration, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that Congress intended
to reject previous holdings that exemption under the Privacy Act leads to
exemption under FOIA. Given the CIIA amendment, however, the Pri-
vacy Act and FOIA must be interpreted separately and independently,
and one may not rely on an exemption in the Privacy Act to preclude
disclosure under FOIA.
38
Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit held that the requested informa-
tion was exempt from disclosure under the Privacy Act but not under the
FOIA. The new provision in the Privacy Act removed the basis for find-
ing an exemption under FOIA. Clearly, Congress has successfully re-
moved one barrier to obtaining information from agencies and the
Seventh Circuit has ruled in accord with this congressional mandate.
Thus, if one looks to section 551 of the FOIA first, and can receive infor-
mation under it, the Privacy Act may not be used to prevent disclosure of
the information.
(A) information compiled for the purpose of identifying individual criminal offenders and
alleged offenders and consisting only of identifying data and notations of arrests, the nature
and disposition of criminal charges, sentencing, confinement, release, and parole and pro-
bation status; (B) information compiled for the purpose of a criminal investigation, includ-
ing reports of informants and investigators, and associated with an identifiable individual;
or (C) reports identifiable to an individual compiled at any stage of the process of enforce-
ment of the criminal laws from arrest or indictment through release from supervision...
33. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3).
34. 721 F.2d 215 (7th Cir. 1983).
35. United States Dept. of Justice v. Provenzano, 105 S. Ct. 413, 414 (1984) (consolidated on
appeal with Shapiro). For explanation of the change in the Privacy Act, see infra note 35-36 and
accompanying text.
36. Central Intelligence Information Act, Pub. L. 98-477. This Act added a provision to the
Privacy Act. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(q)(2).
37. § 552a(q)(2). This provision provides as follows:
Effect of other laws: no agency shall rely on any exemption contained in section 552 of this
title to withhold from an individual any record which is otherwise accessible to such indi-
vidual under the provisions of this section.
38. Id.
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FOURTH AMENDMENT-SEARCH WARRANTS
To protect an industry's right against unreasonable searches and
seizures, an agency must obtain a warrant prior to conducting a non-
consensual search of the company's premises.39 Whether an agency may
obtain a warrant to conduct a wall-to-wall search when the warrant is
based on a complaint alleging violations in a specific area of the premises
is an often litigated issue. In, In re Establishment Inspection of Cerro
Copper Products Company,4° the Seventh Circuit found that the scope of
the warrant issued must be determined on a case-by-case basis, regardless
of the type of complaint issued.
41
In Cerro, an employee filed a complaint with the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), alleging hazardous condi-
tions with respect to machinery used in the company's operations as well
as hazards involved with the use of asbestos gloves. Upon finding reason-
able grounds for the complaint, OSHA sought to conduct health and
safety inspections of the Cerro plant. Cerro refused to permit the inspec-
tions and OSHA obtained search warrants to conduct wall-to-wall health
and safety inspections. 42 Cerro moved to quash the warrants. The dis-
trict court quashed the warrants, finding that the Secretary of Labor
failed to establish a nexus between the complaints and a plantwide haz-
ard. The Seventh Circuit reversed this decision on several grounds.
First, the court acknowledged the test set forth in Marshall v. Bar-
low's, Inc.43 which is used to determine when full scope inspections are
permissible. Marshall," stands for the proposition that in order to estab-
lish probable cause for an inspection, the agency must show that there is
either specific evidence of an existing violation of law, or that reasonable
and neutral legislative and administrative standards for conducting an
inspection have been satisfied. 45 The Seventh Circuit disagreed with the
district court's decision regarding the second part of the test.
The district court found that the applicable statute (CPL 2.12B) was
an unreasonable administrative standard for determining when an in-
spection may be conducted. This is because the statute did not safeguard
against the possibility of selecting an employer to be inspected for im-
39. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 315 (1978).
40. 752 F.2d 280 (7th Cir. 1985).
41. Id. at 283. A warrant may specifically allege violations. A warrant may also be general by
alleging generally that one is violating regulations.
42. Id. at 281.
43. Id. at 282 (citing Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978). See Marshall at notes 22-
23 and accompanying text for an explanation of the two-part test.)
44. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
45. Id.
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proper reasons. The district court relied heavily on the Carondelet46
case. However, the Eighth Circuit subsequently reversed the Carondelet
case. The Eighth Circuit held that determination of whether a general
warrant should be issued must be resolved on a case-by-case basis.47 The
Eighth Circuit indicated five factors to be used in assessing whether CPL
2.12B has been applied neutrally. The five factors are as follows: 48
1. Whether the complaint was motivated by a desire to harass the
employer.
2. Whether the nature of the business and its safety record qualifies it
for a wall-to-wall search.
3. Whether under CPL 2.25C a full scope safety inspection would
not be performed if one had been performed in the past fiscal year.
4. Whether there was an OSHA statement that the facility would
have been due for a routine search even if the complaint had not
been filed.
5. The degree of public interest in the maximization of OSHA's lim-
ited resources.
The Seventh Circuit adopted this approach, finding four of the five
factors weighed in the Secretary's favor.49 Based on these factors, the
Seventh Circuit held that a general wall-to-wall search was reasonable
and thus, reversed the district court's order to quash the warrants.
5 0
The new test adopted by the Seventh Circuit appears to be a fair
mechanism to determine whether CPL 2.12B is being applied neutrally
in cases where general warrants are issued. However, as the dissent
pointed out, OSHA used a very specific complaint as a springboard to
obtain a general warrant. 51 A previous Seventh Circuit case, Donovan v.
Fall River Foundry Co., held that when a general warrant is sought, some
evidence should be presented that supports the belief that hazards exist
throughout the facility. 52 The Seventh Circuit did not discuss the Dono-
van case in its opinion. Instead, the court opted to adopt a test articu-
46. In re Inspection of the Workplace Located at 526 Catalan Street, St. Louis, Missouri, under
the Control or Custody of Carondelet Coke Corporation, Civil D. 83-3175 (E.D. Mo. 1982).
47. 741 F.2d 172 (8th Cir. 1984).
48. Id. These factors do not all have to be met as the Shapiro case indicates. However, the
factors provide guidelines for when a general warrant to inspect would be necessary.
49. 752 F.2d at 283.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 283-84. The dissent notes this because a specific complaint was made in this case. In
the dissent's opinion, the complaint should have been used to obtain a warrant that limited the
inspection to the complained of areas. However, under the test articulated the type of complaint is
not important but whether a general warrant should be issued regardless of the type of complaint.
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
52. 712 F.2d 1103 (7th Cir. 1983). This case supports the dissent in Cerro. For the court in
this case required some evidence of widespread violations before a general warrant will be issued. As
already stated, the court in Cerro chose to adopt a test that does not speak to the issue of evidence.
752 F.2d at 283.
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lated by the Eighth Circuit. Clearly, the Seventh Circuit decided to
choose a test which is more lenient, in that it balances several factors as
opposed to requiring specific evidence of violations. Hence, the Seventh
Circuit has made it easier for an agency to obtain a general warrant when
circumstances point to the conclusion that a general warrant is neces-
sary. This is a more lenient standard because specific evidence of viola-
tions does not appear to be necessary to obtain a general warrant under
the new test.
The preceding three cases illustrate the requirement that agencies
and their rules conform to constitutional standards. Administrative
agencies rule based on statutes created by the legislature. In order to
function properly, agencies must not use their power to infringe one's
constitutional rights. The Seventh Circuit has affirmed this proposition
by setting forth standards to guide the agencies in determining; 1) when
they may release records; 2) how to afford one his due process rights and
3) under what circumstances they may issue general search warrants.
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Certain prerequisites must be met before a court may review the
determination of an administrative agency. A complainant must exhaust
all of his remedies within the agency prior to seeking judicial review.
5 3
In addition, the agency must articulate the basis of its decision before a
court can effectively review an administrative decision. In the 1984-85
term, the Seventh Circuit decided two noteworthy cases dealing with
these aspects of judicial review.
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
CHARLTON V. U.S.
Failing to exhaust administrative remedies when such remedies ex-
ist, bar the filing of a suit in court. In Charlton v. US. 54 the Seventh
Circuit was presented with the question of whether a failure to comply
with an agency's requests for information pursuant to an investigation of
a complaint is a failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Seventh
Circuit held that the failure to supply requested, additional information,
where the notice to the agency contained all of the required elements of a
claim, was not a bar to filing a suit in federal court.55
53. 5 U.S.C. § 704. This Section of the APA provides in pertinent part: "Agency action made
reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court
are subject to judicial review."
54. 743 F.2d 557 (7th Cir. 1984).
55. Id. at 561-62.
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In Charlton, the plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action
under the Federal Tort Claims Act56 after the Veterans Administration
denied two of his claims. Upon the filing of the claims with the Veterans
Administration, the V.A. requested additional information from the
plaintiff. Charlton failed to respond to the V.A.'s request for further in-
formation. Consequently, the V.A. denied Charlton's claims.
57
The Seventh Circuit followed four other circuits58 in holding that
failing to supply requested information is not, in and of itself, a failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. First, the court looked at the relevant
statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 267559 and 28 C.F.R. § 14.4(b). 60 Section 2675
56. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b) and 2671, et seq. The Federal Torts Claim Act governs, among other
things, the handling of tort cases brought by federal employees against the federal government for
injuries sustained during employment.
57. 743 F.2d at 558. The court seems to indicate that because the plaintiff did not supply the
information requested, his claim was denied. The decision to deny did not involve the merits of the
case.
58. Avery v. United States, 680 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1982); Tucker v. United States Postal Ser-
vice, 676 F.2d 954 (3d Cir. 1982); Douglas v. United States, 658 F.2d 445 (6th Cir. 1981); Adams v.
United States, 615 F.2d 284, modified, 622 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1980).
59. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(A). The statute provides in pertinent part:
(a) an action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States for money
damages for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by the negligent
or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the
scope of his office or employment, unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim
to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the
agency in writing and sent by certified or registered mail. The failure of an agency to make
final disposition of a claim within six months after it is filed shall, at the option of the
claimant any time thereafter, be deemed a final denial of the claim for purposes of this
section. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to such claims as may be asserted
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by third party complaint, cross-claim or
counterclaim.
60. 28 C.F.R. § 14.4. The regulation provides in pertinent part:
(b) Personal injury. In support of a claim for personal injury, including pain and suffer-
ing, the claimant may be required to submit the following evidence or information:
(1) A written report by his attending physician or dentist setting forth the nature
and extent of the injury, nature and extent of treatment, any degree of temporary or perma-
nent disability, the prognosis, period of hospitalization, and any diminished earning capac-
ity. In addition, the claimant may be required to submit to a physical or mental
examination by a physician employed by the agency or another Federal agency. A copy of
the report of the examining physician shall be made available to the claimant upon the
claimant's written request provided that he has, upon request, furnished the report referred
to in the first sentence of this paragraph and has made or agrees to make available to the
agency any other physician's reports previously or thereafter made of the physical or
mental condition which is the subject matter of his claim.
(2) Itemized bills for medical, dental and hospital expenses incurred, or itemized
receipts of payment for such expenses.
(3) If the prognosis reveals the necessity for future treatment, a statement of ex-
pected expenses for such treatment.
(4) If a claim is made for loss of time from employment, a written statement from his
employer showing actual time lost from employment, whether he is a full or part-time
employee, and wages or salary actually lost.
(5) If a claim is made for loss of income and the claimant is self-employed, documen-
tary evidence showing the amounts of earnings actually lost.
(6) Any other evidence or information which may have a bearing on either the re-
sponsibility of the United States for the personal injury or the damages claimed.
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states that a claim may be filed in federal court only after agency denial
of the claim, or the agency's failure to act within six months. Section
14.4(b) states that an agency may require the claimant to supply certain
information in personal injury cases. 61 Other circuits have previously
dealt with § 2675 issues.
The First Circuit, in Swift v. United States, 62 found that a federal
suit was barred when the plaintiff failed to supply information, waited
the six-month period, and then filed suit in federal court. However, the
agency never formally denied the claim as in Charlton. The Seventh Cir-
cuit rejected Swift, but not based on this factual distinction.63 Instead,
the Seventh Circuit chose to follow the Fifth and Ninth Circuit's reason-
ing in Adams v. United States,64 and Avery v. United States,65 that non-
compliance with the regulations does not deprive federal courts of
jurisdiction. Both circuits reasoned that if compliance with the regula-
tions was a prerequisite to obtaining jurisdiction in the federal courts,
then agencies could avoid the time limits mandated by § 2675. Hence,
the Charlton court found that if § 2675 incorporated § 14.4(b) an agency
could prolong a claim ad infinitum by continuously requesting additional
information pursuant to § 14.4(b) and thus bar court action. Accord-
ingly, the Seventh Circuit joined the other circuits in holding that the
failure to comply with the regulations, specifically § 14.4(b), cannot act
as a jurisdictional bar to a federal court suit.
66
The Seventh Circuit's holding in Charlton is sound, given the deci-
sions of the other circuits and the danger of an agency using the regula-
tions to extend and prolong making determinations on claims before it.
There is the possibility that a plaintiff may refuse to comply, wait the
requisite six months and then file in court. Essentially, this represents a
loophole favoring plaintiffs. However, a contrary result would unduly
favor the agency, creating situations where claims could be stuck in the
administrative process indefinitely. Clearly, the Charlton decision is fair
and reasonable.
61. This type of information is delineated in C.F.R. § 14.4(b). The statute clearly states that
the government may request additional information from a plaintiff, but it does not state what con-
stitutes the limit on the requests. See supra note 60 for the language of the statute.
62. 614 F.2d 812 (1st Cir. 1980).
63. 743 F.2d at 560.
64. 615 F.2d 284, modified, 622 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1980).
65. 680 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1982).
66. 743 F.2d at 562.
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EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW
NEKOOSA PAPER, INC V. ICC
For a court to effectively review an agency action, the agency must
articulate the basis for its decision. The agency is the finder of fact and
has the advantage of having an abundance of information at its disposal.
In Nekoosa Paper, Inc. v. ICC,67 the Seventh Circuit reviewed a final
order of the Interstate Commerce Commission. However, the ICC did
not articulate the standard it applied in rendering its decision. Therefore,
the Seventh Circuit vacated the decision and remanded the case to the
ICC for further proceedings. 68
Nekoosa Paper involved a dispute over rail rates. The plaintiffs al-
leged that certain railroads established rates at such a high level that they
produced an anti-competitive effect on the wood fiber industry. 69 The
anti-competitive effect resulted because the rates placed manufacturers
located closer to western softwood sources at an advantage to those lo-
cated farther away. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) rejected the
complaint. On administrative review, the ICC Review Board affirmed
the ALJ's decision.
The Seventh Circuit discussed the substantive evidence presented to
the agency, however, it could not review the rules the agency used in
reaching its decision because the ICC did not articulate the basis of its
decision. Thus, the Seventh Circuit vacated the decision and remanded
the case to the ICC for further proceedings.70 The ICC, by not articulat-
ing the standards used, effectively precluded judicial review.
The Seventh Circuit, in reaching its conclusion, referred to two pre-
vious Seventh Circuit cases, which explain the necessity for an agency to
articulate the standards used in the decision making process. 71 Review
assures that an agency correctly and fairly applies the rules and its dispo-
sal to the record before it. Absent articulation of those rules by the
agency involved, a reviewing court cannot effectively determine the fair-
ness and appropriateness of the administrative action. 72 As the court
67. 739 F.2d 258 (7th Cir. 1984).
68. Id. at 261-62.
69. Id. at 259. The petitioners are paper manufacturers. Their major manufacturing facilities
are located in Wisconsin. The bulk of softwood fiber sources which petitioners require are located in
other states. The petitioners allege that the specific respondent railroad carriers dominate the ship-
ping routes between their manufacturing facilities and the softwood fiber sources.
70. 739 F.2d at 261-62.
71. Id. at 260 (citing Saylor v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 723 F.2d 581, 582 (7th Cir.
1983); City Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 600 F.2d 681, 688
(7th Cir. 1979)).
72. 739 F.2d at 260.
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noted, the ICC is a "permanent expert body" and thus, is accorded great
deference in its decision.73 However, as the Supreme Court stated in Mo-
tor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. ,74 an agency must clearly explain the basis of its decisions.
Absent a clear explanation, even "permanent expert body's" decision,
such as the ICC's, cannot be accorded deference.
75
The Nekoosa Paper case illustrates the need for the different
branches of government to maintain a system of checks and balances. By
requiring a clear explanation from an agency concerning the basis of its
decisions, a reviewing court is in a position to effectively review the deci-
sion. If this articulation was not required, an agency could conceivably
rule in any way it pleased and the courts would have no basis for deter-
mining the reasonableness of the decision. This would give agencies a
great deal of power and effectively foreclose any petitioners' chances on
appeal. Everyone has a right to judicial review, thus, as the Seventh Cir-
cuit logically held in Nekoosa Paper, an agency must cogently explain the
basis of its decision so as to allow for effective judicial review.
RULEMAKING
ST. JAMES HOSPITAL V. HECKLER
Agencies have the authority to and often promulgate rules. APA
§ 551-559 provides that an agency's actions may not be either arbitrary
and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or contrary to the law. 76 When
promulgating a rule, the APA § 553(c) requires a statement of basis and
purpose for the rule.77 In the 1984-85 term, the Seventh Circuit decided
a particularly noteworthy case that concerned these two provisions of the
APA.
In St. James Hospital v. Heckler,78 the Seventh Circuit had to deter-
mine whether 1) the Secretary of Health and Human Services acted arbi-
trarily in promulgating a particular rule and 2) whether the Secretary
failed to supply a statement and basis purpose for the rule.
79
73. Id. at 262.
74. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
75. 739 F.2d at 262.
76. 5 U.S.C. § 551-559.
77. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) provides in pertinent part:
After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested persons an opportu-
nity to participate in the rulemaking through submission of written data, views, or argu-
ments with or without opportunity for oral presentation. After consideration of the
relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise gen-
eral statement of their basis and purpose...
78. 760 F.2d 1460 (7th Cir. 1985).
79. Id. at 1465. A third issue involved the question of whether the Medical Malpractice Rule
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FACTS
The Secretary of Health and Human Services promulgated a rule,
(Malpractice Rule) segregating insurance premiums from other general
and administrative costs for purposes of reimbursement from Medicare
for physicians of Medicare patients. Before promulgating the rule, the
Secretary issued the rule for public comment.80 Over 600 comments
were sent the Secretary by healthcare institutions, consumers, insurance
companies, actuaries, healthcare consultants, physicians, nurses and
Medicare beneficiaries. Each of these comments were opposed to the
proposed rule and recommended its complete withdrawal. Despite the
obvious opposition to the rule, it was issued. In deciding to issue the
rule, the Secretary relied on the Westat Study, which contained statistics
concerning medical malpractice claims.
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS
An agency rule may be arbitrary and capricious for several reasons.
It may be arbitrary and capricious because it relies on factors which Con-
gress did not intend it to consider, it fails to consider an important aspect
of the problem, it is contrary to the evidence before the agency or it is
implausible. 81 The Seventh Circuit determined that the Malpractice
Rule was arbitrary and capricious because the Secretary failed to con-
sider important aspects of the problem and because the decision was con-
trary to evidence before the agency.
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In so holding, the Seventh Circuit focused its discussion on the Sec-
retary's reliance on the Westat Study. The Seventh Circuit noted several
important sources of possible bias in the Study. First, the Study's pur-
pose was to determine the factors influencing the frequency of medical
malpractice claims and the size of the awards.83 Second, only one of the
Study's chapters addressed Medicare patients.8 4 Third, the Study sur-
veyed medical malpractice claims closed during a four-month period
was within the scope of the Medicare Act. This issue deals with the actual substance of the rule and
will not be discussed.
80. Under 5 U.S.C. § 553, the Secretary must issue any proposed rule for public comment.
This is so that all concerned parties have a chance to voice their opinion on the subject. The com-
ments received by the Secretary contained seven criticisms of the proposed rule. Their substance is
not relevant to this discussion, but see 760 F.2d at 1464 for a list of the actual criticisms.
81. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 44 (1983). This case served to indicate when an agency rule or decision may be arbitrary and
capricious.
82. 760 F.2d at 1469.
83. Id. at 1466.
84. Id.
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thus limiting the scope of the Study.85 Fourth, the Study lacked com-
plete data on the identity of defendants in multiple defendant cases.
8 6
Finally, the authors of the Study cautioned its readers on its limited
scope and possible biases. 87  Because the Secretary relied solely on this
Study as the basis of her rule, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's holding that the Secretary acted arbitrarily and capriciously.
88
The Seventh Circuit also found that the Secretary failed to consider other
important aspects of the malpractice problem and the Westat Study.
These aspects include the Secretary's failure to consider that the Westat
Study was not a sufficient basis for the rule. The other important factor
was that objections to the rule were not given a consideration. Hence,
the decision was found to be arbitrary and capricious. This holding is in
accord with two other circuits and fifteen district courts.89
INADEQUATE BASIS AND PURPOSE STATEMENT
One of the procedural requirements of the APA is that the agency
incorporate in the rules promulgated, a concise basis and purpose state-
ment.90 The basis and purpose statement must identify the issues of pol-
icy discussed and the agency's treatment of them. The Seventh Circuit
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1467.
88. Id. at 1468. Upon reviewing the evidence concerning the reliability of the Westat Study,
the court concluded that the Secretary abused her discretion by relying solely on a study with blatant
and admitted limits and deficiencies.
89. See 760 F.2d 1460, 1462 (7th Cir. 1985) n. 1. The courts in accord are as follows:
Humana of Aurora, Inc. v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1579 (10th Cir. 1985), rev'g, No. 83-Z-70 (D.
Colo. Sept. 19, 1983); Abington Memorial Hosp. v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1984),
affig, 576 F. Supp. 1081 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Arkansas Methodist Hosp. v. Heckler, 597 F.
Supp. 238 (E.D. Ark. 1984); East Jefferson Gen. Hosp. v. Heckler, No. 83-4107 (E.D. La.
Oct. 19, 1984); St. Anthony Regional Hosp. v. Heckler, 613 F. Supp. 23 (N.D. Iowa 1984);
Parkway Medical Center v. Heckler, Nos. 83-1700 and 83-1005 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 24, 1984);
Mercy Medical Center v. Heckler, No. 3-82 CIV 1724 (D. Minn. Aug. 17, 1984); Menorah
Medical Center v. Heckler, No. 83-0822-CV-W-4 (W.D. Mo. July 26, 1984); Metropolitan
Hosp., Inc. v. Heckler, No. C-83-502 A (N.D. Ga. June 25, 1984); DeSoto Gen. Hosp. v.
Heckler, No. 83-1050-B (M.D. La. June 20, 1984); Alexandria Hosp. v. Heckler, 586 F.
Supp. 581 (E.D. Va. 1984); Lloyd Noland Hosp. & Clinic v. Heckler, No. CV83-PT-0868-S
(N.D. Ala. Apr. 6, 1984); Bedford County Memorial Hosp. v. Heckler, 583 F. Supp. 367
(W.D. Va. 1984), affd, 769 F.2d 1017; St. Joseph's Hosp. v. Heckler, 583 F. Supp. 1545
(D. Ariz. 1984); Albany Gen. Hosp. v. Heckler, 584 F. Supp. 614 (D. Or. 1984); Chelsea
Community Hosp. v. Heckler, No. 83CV-6126-AA (E.D. Mich. Dec. 20, 1983); Mt. Car-
mel Mercy Hosp. v. Heckler, 581 F. Supp. 1311 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
The cases that have held to the contrary are as follows:
Boswell v. Heckler, 573 F. Supp. 884 (D.D.C. 1983), remanded on procedural grounds, 749
F.2d 788 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Humana of Aurora, Inc. v. Heckler, No. 83-Z-70 (D. Colo.
Sept. 19, 1983), rev'd, 753 F.2d 1579 (10th Cir. 1985); Cumberland Medical Center v.
Heckler, 578 F. Supp. 39 (M.D. Tenn. 1983), appeal docketed, No. 83-5579 (6th Cir. Aug.
9, 1983); Athens Community Hosp. v. Heckler, 565 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Tenn. 1983), ap-
peal docketed, No. 83-5546 (6th Cir. Aug. 5, 1983).
90. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). See infra note 77 for the language of the text. The text indicates that all
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held that the Secretary did not comply with this requirement of the
APA. 91
The Seventh Circuit found that the Secretary made no attempt to
respond to criticisms of the Westat Study. 92 Many comments charged
that the Study was statistically unreliable and that the Study's authors
cautioned against its use due to its limited scope.93 The connection be-
tween the Study and the basis and purpose statement was the Secretary's
failure to give any reason for her reliance on the Study. However, the
Secretary attempted to respond to these comments on appeal. The Sev-
enth Circuit held that the Secretary's late response would not compen-
sate for her failure to respond to the criticisms of the Study in the basis
and purpose statement. 94 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's conclusion that the Secretary failed to comply with Sec-
tion 553(c) of the APA.
95
The Seventh Circuit's findings in St. James Hospital, are justified.
As the court correctly notes, the opportunity to comment on proposed
rules is meaningless unless those comments are addressed and given con-
sideration.96 Clearly, the Seventh Circuit's holding is reasonable and
consistent with the APA. This is because a court cannot properly and
efficiently review an agency's rule unless the agency explains the reasons
for promulgating the rule. It is consistent with the APA § 553(c) be-
cause this Section requires an agency to supply an adequate basis and
purpose statement when a rule is promulgated, and given the evidence,
the Secretary clearly did not comply with the APA. Furthermore, al-
lowing the Secretary to promulgate rules without requiring justification
would grant agencies unlimited power to control the types and substance
of rules issued. This would also contradict the purpose of judicial review.
Clearly, the Seventh Circuit's decision is justified and consistent with the
letter and purpose of the APA.
evidence and comments are taken into consideration a basis and purpose statement illustrating the
reasons behind the rule must be incorporated into the rule.
91. 760 F.2d at 1470. The Secretary apparently did not support her reasons for promulgating
the rule.
92. Id. at 1469.
93. Id. at 1468. Although these comments were made by many and there were no comments to
the contrary the Secretary did not even mention why she chose to ignore the comments.
94. Id. at 1468-69.
95. Id. at 1473.
96. Id. at 1470. This is understandable. Clearly the statute would not have required that those
concerned be given an opportunity to comment on a rule if the comments were not to be considered
when promulgating a rule.
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CONCLUSION
These decisions illustrate the Seventh Circuit's efforts to control
agency behavior. The emphasis appears to be on safeguarding individu-
als' basic rights and not allowing agencies too much power. As noted
throughout the discussion, the Seventh Circuit has ruled consistently
with precedent and has tried to remain uniform with the other circuits.
Although the Seventh Circuit may seem to let the agencies have some
leeway in a few areas, the overriding goal is to protect individuals' rights
and maintain a system of checks and balances.
